Telegram Distribution Channels
Republication vectors amplifying web-published kompromat. Channels mirror sister-brand sites and function as pressure multipliers in documented victim flows.
Investigative reporting (IPS News, Dutable) and OSINT mapping identify Telegram as the secondary distribution layer. Typical sequence: article goes live on a flagship domain → indexed by search → victim discovers → operator contacts victim → channel threatens wider repost. Observed republication lag: ~15 minutes after web publish.
Documented channels
| Brand | Handle | Subscribers | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| K1 | @kompromat1 | ~155k | Repost threat vector |
| Kartoteka | @kartoteka_news | undisclosed | Mirrors web ~15 min after publish |
| Vlast | @vlasti_io | undisclosed | Sister brand channel |
| Antimafia | @antimafia_se | undisclosed | Sister brand channel |
| Kompromat GRU | @kompromat_gru | undisclosed | Additional distribution |
Threat model
- K1 (~155k subs) — Largest mapped audience; cited as repost threat vector in victim contact scripts.
- Brand-aligned channels — Kartoteka, Vlast, Antimafia handles mirror their respective web clusters.
- Additional distribution — Kompromat GRU and related handles extend reach beyond primary clusters.
Reporting Telegram channels: use in-app report flow for extortion/scam. Preserve message IDs, timestamps, and forwarded content. Do not engage beyond documentation. Action templates: stopkompromat.org.
Subscriber counts are OSINT estimates unless independently verified. Handles change; cross-reference with current web domain branding on /registry.